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Abstract: 
 
This paper critiques the primordial and ethnosymbolic theories of identity that 
have come to dominate explanations of Iraq’s descent into violent instability 
after the 2003 invasion. It argues that Iraq’s contemporary politics can only be 
understood by examining its history over the longue durée not the past fifteen 
years. The paper critically interacts with modernist theories of nationalism and 
their relevance to explaining identities in the Middle East. It then deploys the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu, specifically his notion of field and capital, to explain 
the relationship between four ‘principles of visions’ that have competed to 
dominate Iraq’s political field. 
 
Bio: 
 
Toby Dodge teaches in the International Relations Department at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science. He is also Director of its Middle 
East Centre.  He is the author of Inventing Iraq: the failure of nation building 
and a history denied (2003) and Iraq; from war to a new authoritarianism 
(2012). He has published previous papers in The Review of International 
Studies, International Affairs, International Peacekeeping, Monde Arabe, 
Maghreb-Machrek, International Politics and Third World Quarterly. 
 
Contact: 
 
Toby Dodge, Department of International Relations, London School of 
Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE. 
 
B.t.Dodge@lse.ac.uk 
 
‘Bourdieu goes to Baghdad; explaining hybrid political identities in Iraq’.  
Toby Dodge
1
 
                                              
The majority of the research and the writing for this paper was carried out at 
the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute. While a Visiting 
Scholar there I benefitted a great deal from extended discussions with Peter 
Sluglett about all aspects of Iraqi history and politics. Sadly, Peter died before 
this paper was published so I would like to dedicate it to his memory both as an 
innovative scholar of Iraq and a friend. I would also like to thank Engseng 
Ho and Michelle Teo for their generous hospitality at the institute.  I would like 
to thank Clare Day for her comments on the paper as well as Kamran Matin 
and Clemens Hoffmann for their detailed and thoughtful suggestions. In 
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“What appears to us today as self-evident, as beneath consciousness and 
choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as 
the result of dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated 
groups. The major effect of historical evolution is to abolish history by 
relegating to the past, to the unconscious, the lateral possibilities that it 
eliminated” (Bourdieu 1994: 15). 
 
Introduction. 
 
Since the US-led invasion of March 2003, Iraq’s political field has been 
increasingly dominated by overtly sectarian rhetoric. Initially, the country was 
swept up in an insurgency against foreign occupation justified by territorial 
nationalism. However, a militant form of Sunni Islamism quickly infused that 
conflict.  The fight then degenerated into a civil war understood by participants 
and observers in terms of the violent assertion of ethnic and religious identity.  
Finally, in June 2014, Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, fell to the rejuvenated 
forces of the Islamic State or Daesh who claimed to be recreating a trans-
national Sunni caliphate, seeking to unite Muslims under their austere, violent 
and deeply sectarian interpretation of Islam.  
 
Although there have been notable exceptions (Shadid 2005, Rosen 2010, 
Diamond 2005, Herring and Rangwala 2005, Bouillon, Malone and Rowswell 
2007 and Dodge 2012), the dominant analytical framework adopted by those 
seeking to explain post-invasion Iraq tends to be shaped by either an ahistoric 
primordialism or a reworked and hence more intellectually sophisticated ethno-
symbolic approach. Three indicative examples of this show the influence of 
this analytical framework at work in journalism, the work of participant 
observers and academics. From 2003 to 2007, Nicholas Pelham was one of the 
most astute foreign correspondents working in Iraq, bringing a fine-grained, 
almost anthropological, detail to his reporting.  However, when his dispatches 
were collected together in a book, (2008), Pelham framed four years of detailed 
reporting by encapsulating his writing within a primordial approach that 
described not only Iraq’s history but that of the wider Middle East in terms of 
trans-historical sectarian conflict (2008). This primordial approach was 
developed to an even greater extent by the best-selling work of Ali Allawi 
(2007), a former Minister of Trade and Defence under the American 
occupation of Iraq. Citing the 1950s Iraqi Sociologist, Ali al-Wardi, Allawi 
develops an argument that sees “the process of modernisation and urbanisation 
as skin deep in Iraq” (13), leaving a “a conflict-strewn society”, where “mutual 
antagonism”, both between Sunni and Shia and tribal and urban dominate (14). 
This analysis allows Allawi to trace the evolution of the post-2003 conflict 
                                                                                                                                 
addition, thanks are due to John Breuilly, Craig Calhoun, Fannar Haddad, Ted 
Hopf and Umut Özkirimli for their insights into both political identity and Iraq.  
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back to the split within Islam, the “great divide” between Sunni and Shia and, 
unproblematically, homogenise both groups as they entered into a conflict 
increasingly dominated by the violent assertion of different religious identities. 
 
The most sophisticated academic advocate of the ethno-symbolic approach to 
understanding Iraq is Fanar Haddad, in one of the most important books 
published on Iraq since 2003 (2011). Following A.D. Smith’s work, Haddad 
explains Iraq’s history by placing causal weight on the conflict between 
“competing myth-symbol complexes”, which provide “ontological security” 
for their adherents but also, at the same time, draw groups into assertive 
conflict with each other.  For Haddad, Iraq’s society, at different times, is 
divided into Sunni and Shia myth-symbol complexes with conflict between 
them reaching two separate peaks, first after the uprisings and state suppression 
of 1991 and then after the invasion of 2003. Although Haddadd is careful to 
stress the temporal fluidity of these complexes, his reading of Iraqi history 
leads to a “skepticism towards the possibility of a Sunni-Shi’a 
religious/theological rapprochement” and a sense that across Iraq, conflict 
between these two complexes seemed inevitable. 
 
The analytical primordialisation of Iraq, Syria and then the wider Middle East 
accelerated after the fall of Mosul in 2014 and reached its peak with the 
hundred year anniversary of the Sykes-Picot agreement in May 2016. Under 
this narrative instability across the Middle East was caused by the ‘false states’ 
created by the Sykes-Picot agreement. This reading was then deployed by both 
academics and journalists to explain the violent crisis that engulfed the region 
after the ‘Arab Spring’ (Nasr 2014). The popular rendition of this approach 
gained its widest audience with a series of articles written by Robin Wright, 
who argued that the only way to bring peace and stability back to the region 
would to divide it up into fourteen new, more religiously and ethnically 
homogeneous states (Wright 2013, 2016). 
 
Unlike the majority of recent work on Iraq and, increasingly, the wider Middle 
East, this paper deploys a Historical Sociological approach to argue that what 
appears to be self-evident today, the dominance of Iraq’s political field by 
groups deploying sectarian rhetoric, is in fact an historical aberration. This 
point, the comparative novelty of sectarian politics, has been missed by media 
pundits, freshly minted think tank experts and some academics. Faced with the 
startling and fast moving events after 2003, the most readily available 
explanation involved the deployment of a form of populist primordialism, 
seeking to explain Iraq’s contemporary descent into violence and radicalisation 
not in terms of a recklessly incompetent foreign intervention but instead by 
reference to supposedly trans-historical religious and ethnic identities, which 
allegedly pre-dated the creation of the Iraqi state in 1920 but have retained the 
capacity to dominate its politics.  
 
 4 
There are at least two ways in which Historical Sociology can provide a 
particularly powerful antidote to primordial readings of Iraq. Firstly, at the core 
of Historical Sociological method is a powerful dialogue between “the nature 
and effects of large-scale structures and long-term processes of change” 
(Skocpol 1984b: 359). This makes the deployment of explanatory theory “more 
explicit, subjecting it to logical scrutiny, and challenging it substantively” 
(Calhoun 1998: 855-6). If successful, the result is an analysis that works on 
three levels, certainly describing immediate events but also “the subjective 
world of action” and, most importantly, structural causality (Abrams 1982: 64). 
This approach then allows for the ahistorical approach of primordialism to be 
challenged by a detailed and analytically nuanced study of Iraq over the longue 
durée, from its pre-state origins within the Ottoman Empire, through its 
creation as a state under British colonial occupation, to its independence and 
the series of bloody coups that destabilised the country up to 1968. 
 
However, seeking to do justice to the complexities and nuances of Iraq’s 
history through a flight into historically informed social science, specifically 
sociologically shaped theories of nationalism, brings with it its own set of 
problems. Theories of national identity have long been riven, if not stultified, 
by two competing schools of thought, a broadly modernist approach and its 
theoretical other, ethnosymbolism. Even a cursory examination of Iraq’s whole 
political history, as opposed to the last fifteen years, shows both the 
applicability of modernist understandings of nationalism but also the damage 
that they can do to historical complexity, through an implicit teleology linked 
to the dominance of ‘sociologism’. 
 
This paper will certainly utilise some of the insights of the modernist approach 
to nationalism. However, it will combine these with the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu, especially his concepts of field, capital and symbolic power. The 
boundaries of Iraq’s political field and who has the right to be a member of it 
have been the key point of contention since the creation of the state in 1920. 
The terrain over which this struggle has been fought is the competition for the 
symbolic power to define boundaries and membership.  
 
Bourdieu was certainly a Sociologist who was comfortable working within a 
long-range historical context.  His major work focused on how hierarchies of 
power were created, challenged and sustained.  However, the powerful insights 
of Bourdieu’s work, especially when applied to the longue durée of Iraqi 
history, come primarily from his relational approach, where competition for 
dominance within a field shapes both the nature of that field and the value of 
the capital being fought over.  So, for Bourdieu, meaning becomes relational, 
with individuals, groups and states being interdependent units involved in 
competitive struggles that gives rise to the properties attached to them 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97, Swartz 2013: 22: Swartz 1998: 61, 63). It is 
the deployment of a Historical Sociological approach shaped by Bourdieu’s 
analytical categories and his relational approach that provides the best way to 
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escape the ahistorical primordialisation of Iraq but also the intellectual stasis 
produced within the study of nationalism by the modernist-ethnosymbolic 
debate. 
 
Theories of national identity. 
 
As the modernist approach would assume, the Middle East, in the nineteenth 
century, was undoubtedly transformed by its integration into the world 
economy.  This had far reaching ramifications for the political identities of 
what was to become the population of Iraq.   As such the overtly modernist 
theories of nationalism capture, but only partially explain, the processes the 
region went through at the end of the Ottoman Empire and the period under 
European colonial rule (Gelvin 2009).  For Gellner, the modernist 
transformation is exemplified by the move from an agrarian to an industrialised 
society, a move from face-to-face interaction to one of “… exo-socialisation, 
the production and reproduction of men outside the local intimate unit …”. 
This exo-socialisation delivers the requirements of a mass society: “… a 
universal, standardised, context free …” communication.  It also leads to a 
unificatory “high culture”, homogenising the newly industrialised society thus 
creating the preconditions for the spread of nationalism (Gellner 1983: 14, 
Gellner 1996: 106, Gellner 1994: 26). In his expansion of the modernist 
account, Anderson’s description of the move from the pre-modern to the 
modern includes the transformation of large cultural systems, Christianity, 
Islam and the Chinese Middle Kingdom from “… centripetal and hierarchical” 
to “boundary-oriented and horizontal”. This occurs through the “… gradual 
demotion of the sacred language”. This process is driven by the rise of a 
“clocked, calendrical time” and the spread of print capitalism and the resultant 
dominance of vernacular languages (Benedict Anderson 1999: 14, 18, 26, 45). 
 
Both Gellner and Anderson and beyond them the whole intellectual edifice that 
is the modernist account of nationalism have come under sustained critique.  
First Gellner has been repeatedly accused of excessive structuralism, “single-
minded economic functionalism” and immoderate materialism, because of his 
portrayal of the teleological and deterministic outcomes of industrialisation. Of 
equal importance for a sustainable explanation of contested political identities 
in Iraq, he has been accused of explaining away the ideological power and 
centrality of nationalism to identity by seeing them as a mechanical by-product 
of modernity (Perry Anderson 1992: 201, 207, 208). An even more relevant 
critique for Iraq are Chatterjee’s inter-twined accusations of ‘sociologism’, 
Eurocentricsm and reductionism. Under this rubric the modernist school sees 
the rise of nationalism in the colonial and post-colonial world as an outcome of 
universal sociological processes that remove any agency from the recipients of 
a coercively delivered late modernity (Chatterjee 1996: 216, Chatterjee 1999: 
21-22). Modernist accounts not only remove agency, the ability to shape 
identity through mobilisation and protest, but also complexity, the interaction 
between geo-temporally specific ideological structures and the transformatory 
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capacities of modernity.  For Anderson and Gellner, nationalism in its global 
form is modular, whereas for Chatterjee in India, but also, for this paper, in 
Iraq, it is the outcome of contested, often violent, struggles between locally 
situated discourses and the transformation that modernity brings. 
 
The major academic alternative to this modernist account is A.D. Smith’s 
ethnosymbolism. Smith certainly recognises, if not reifies, the continuities 
across the modernist watershed. For Smith, these powerful historical 
continuities are situated within ‘ethnies’, “named and self-defined human 
communities” “whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared 
memories, one or more elements of common culture” and hence solidarity 
(Smith 2009: 26).  For Smith the ubiquity of trans-historical ethnies makes 
them central to understanding the rise of nationalism. Given Gellner’s 
economic functionalism and rationalism, Smith’s approach certainly identifies 
the passions that political identity can engender, he also focuses on the symbols 
and mythologies involved in collective ideational mobilisation. However, the 
reification of ethnies opens Smith up to accusations of primordialism, giving 
them trans if not ahistorical causal powers, acting as the base for all successful 
nationalisms, with nationalism itself given sociological reality beyond the 
ideational force of Smith’s ‘myth-symbol’ complex (Smith 1986: 14, Smith 
2009: 13). 
 
The modernist moment in the Middle East. 
 
At first glance, the socio-economic transformation that the Ottoman Empire 
underwent in the eighteen hundreds, driven by both its integration into the 
world economy and its defensive modernisation, appears to mirror the working 
assumptions of the modernist school. There was clearly a transformation of 
societal units with a move from localised face-to-face interactions to the 
dominance of mass ‘exo-socialisation’. With the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire we see the ‘transformation of large cultural systems’ along with the 
spread of print capitalism.  However, in the Middle East, the causality 
modernists see as accompanying this, for Gellner, the birth of a homogenising 
‘high culture’ and for Anderson, the rise of a unitary ‘imagined community’ 
did not happen. Instead, a number of ideologies came into competition, all the 
product of a modernist transformation, some with their roots in pre-
transformation ideological formations with other being overtly modernist 
(Gelvin 2009 Gelvin 1991). Hanna Batatu sums up the outcome of this struggle 
in Iraq: 
“ … the elements of the traditional social structures and the attendant 
values and categories of understanding did not disappear, but survived, 
if in diluted form, alongside the new mentalities and the new structural 
elements and principles. In fact, often the very same group bore the 
imprints of the two structures in combined form” (Batatu 1989: 11). 
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Those in Iraq pursing a modernist ideology of unitary nationalism can be 
divided by the boundaries of the political field they were fighting for and how 
they wanted to define membership of that field. Some fought for a territorial 
nationalism (wataniyya), seeking to unite Iraqis round a common set of unitary 
myths and cultural reference points. Others stressed a Pan-Arabism 
(qawmiyya), which sought the unity of all Arabs within one state, stressing 
linguistic commonality, religious heritage and an expansive Arab history.  In 
addition, there were those seeking to mobilise a Kurdish national identity 
around a different set of linguistic, cultural and historical markers. All of these 
competing groups were the product of a modernist ‘awakening’, driven by the 
rise of print capitalism, a new class of professional intellectuals and the spread 
of mass politics along with a reaction to the centralising ‘defensive 
modernisation’ of the late Ottoman Empire (Bashkin 2011: 294, Davis 2005, 
Rhys Bajalan 2016: 140-157). Whilst urban areas transformed more readily, 
regions geographically and economically peripheral to the world market, 
experienced the effects in a more diffuse fashion. Also involved in the fight to 
categorise and hence dominate Iraq’s new political field were those whose 
mobilisation was defensive, seeking to assert an identity they felt was 
threatened by a new secular form of mass politics (Gelvin 1999).  This counter-
reaction, also by its very nature modern, involved those asserting religiously 
based identities, both Sunni and Shia, but also those evoking a tribal identity 
(Jabar and Dawod 2003, and Jabar 2003). 
 
Bourdieu’s political field and symbolic power. 
 
The analytical task of this paper is to explain the development of Iraq’s 
relational political field over the longue durée not ahistorcially from 2003 
onwards. This has to be done without reifying any of the competing identities 
that exist within it. Pierre Bourdieu’s key analytical concepts of ‘field’ and 
different forms of ‘capital’ allow for this type of examination, stressing the 
political field’s fluid and competitive nature. His relational sociology draws 
attention to the mutually defining competition between those attempting to 
impose different conceptions of Iraq’s political identity. His focus on symbolic 
violence stresses the fact that this competition is ultimately about a struggle to 
impose one dominant vision of what Iraq is and who Iraqis are on the whole 
political field. 
 
Bourdieu’s development of ‘field theory’ is especially useful for understanding 
Iraqi politics (Zubaida 1989: 145-150, Zubaida 1991: 207). For Bourdieu, a 
society is comprised of “… relatively autonomous social microcosms … spaces 
of objective power relations…” or fields. These objective power relations are 
imposed on any person or group who enters the field. Fields then become 
determined by the relative power of the groups struggling within them for 
domination, either to conserve their existing position or transform the field to 
their advantage. The boundaries of the field are also determined by those 
struggling within it, with the determination of what the field encompasses a 
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central part of that struggle (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 97, 101, 104, 
Bourdieu 2005: 30).
 The boundaries of Iraq’s political field were a central point 
of contest from the 1920s to the 1970s: was Iraq simply a part of a wider Arab 
nation or a territorially delineated nation of its own, was the field dominated by 
a broadly secular nationalism or a community or uma defined by Islam? 
 
For Bourdieu, the political field is not simply the state. The state is conceived 
of as an “ensemble of administrative or bureaucratic fields”, multiple sites of 
contestation where the struggle is for “the monopoly of legitimate symbolic 
violence, i.e., the power to constitute and to impose as universal and 
universally applicable within a given ‘nation’ …” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 
1992: 111-112). This disaggregation of the state captures the reality of political 
struggle in Iraq.  The coercive field was a constant site of competition between 
1920 and 1968, with groups vying for dominance both within the official 
boundaries of the state and external to it.  
 
Bourdieu understands the political field as having comparative autonomy, it is 
not simply the arena of overt class or economic interests. It is the site where 
political parties and professional politicians struggle for domination (Davis 
2010: 206). Throughout Iraq’s history the struggle to dominate the political 
field was not simply reducible to class or economic interests. The competition 
was to impose a vision of what the social world consists of “… a symbolic 
power to impose beliefs, recognised principles of vision…” The audience for 
this struggle is the wider public, with politicians competing for the power of “ 
… surreptitious imposition of categories of perception endowed with authority 
and designed to become legitimate categories of perception”. The aim is to 
mobilise the population behind the competing ‘principles of visions’ within the 
field (Bourdieu 2005: 36-39).
 
 In Iraq these principles of visions have been both 
nationalist but also, simultaneously, communalist. 
 
Bourdieu also stresses that the power within a field is relational. Individuals 
and the groups they belonged to are enmeshed within broad networks that 
shape their consciousness and their actions.  Understanding the struggle over 
Iraq’s political field as relational allows analysis to move away from modernist 
teleologies but also a focus on primordial trans-historical continuities, each 
principle of vision, struggling to impose symbolic violence on the field, is 
locked in an interactive and hence transformative struggle with its competitors. 
 
Bourdieu see power within any given field as determined by the different types 
of capital each player can deploy in their struggle for domination.  The value of 
these different forms of capital change from field to field, depending on the 
nature of the struggle. Economic capital, the power to deploy financial 
resources is straightforward.  Social capital comes from the extent of an actor’s 
networks and associates “the size of the network of connections he can 
effectively mobilise” (Bourdieu 1986: 241-258). Cultural capital is central to 
Bourdieu’s argument that culture has a stratifying power within society.  The 
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third and most important type of capital is symbolic capital and symbolic 
power. It is the struggle for symbolic power within Iraq’s political field that is 
the main explanatory focus of this paper. Symbolic capital has the ability to 
legitimise power relations. Those who wield symbolic capital, writers, teachers, 
and journalists for example, have the ability to shape and legitimise perceptions 
of the social order (Swartz 1998). Symbolic power comes from the ability to 
manipulate symbolic systems. Symbolic systems deliver individual cognition, 
communication and societal differentiation (Swartz 1998). Symbolic power is 
thus “… the power to constitute the given by stating it, to act upon the world by 
acting upon the representation of the world …” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 
148). 
 
Overall, Bourdieu’s understanding of social struggle and the political identities 
that originate from it, stress the centrality of symbolic classifications. Cognitive 
conceptions are directly shaped by social structures and both are fought over by 
groups within the political sphere seeking ideational dominance.  
 
Bourdieu goes to Baghdad; seeking to understand hybrid political identities in 
Iraq.  
 
Competition within Iraq’s political field has tended to oscillate around four 
‘principles of vision’, with various groups struggling to obtain symbolic 
dominance by adopting one of these visions whilst also actively taking 
concepts, symbolism or rhetoric from the other competing visions.  From the 
creation of the political field up until the 1970s, the main contest was between 
an Iraqist (wataniyya) conception of the field and an Arab nationalist 
(qawmiyya) one.  However, by the late 1920s a third principle of vision, that of 
a Kurdish nationalism, had cohered in the process of developing an 
antagonistic relationship with both Arab and Iraqist nationalism.  The entry 
into the political field of groups promoting a specifically Shia vision came in 
the late 1970s in the face of ferocious repression from the then Baathist 
government.   This Shia majoritarian vision gained coherence through the 
1990s, but only came to fruition in exile and was brought back into the Iraqi 
political field after regime change in 2003.  Finally, a principle of vision that 
promoted a specifically Sunni identity was a late entrant into the political field, 
only solidifying into coherence after 2003.  
 
As Brubaker and Cooper argue, none of these principle visions should be 
treated as sociological categories. The interactive relationship between the 
political groups utilising them indicates that they are at best a “category of 
practice” that at times indicate high levels of  “relational connectedness” 
between those that acknowledge or accept the claims being made. However, at 
other times these visions represent little more than the political aspirations of 
the individuals and groups that deploy them (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000: 
2,4,5). 
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Arab nationalism in Iraq’s political field.  
 
The first ‘principle of vision’, Arab nationalism, came to dominate Iraq’s 
political field in the aftermath of the coup that followed the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908. This marked the start of a struggle to define the boundaries 
of a political field and attempts to deploy symbolic violence to define the 
identity of the people who lived within those boundaries. This struggle was 
triggered by and reacted to the assertion of an increasingly Turkified 
centralising Ottoman Empire. Arab secret societies, like al-Ahd, were formed 
to counter this with an alternative Arab nationalism. It was the Iraqi members 
of al-Ahd, former officers in the Ottoman army, who went on to form the core 
of Iraq’s governing elite round the new king Faisal (Simon 1986: 27). 
 
Once the Iraqi state had been established and its institutions built under the 
British held League of Nation’s mandate, those promoting an Arab nationalist 
vision of the political field gained ascendency. The Arab nationalist cause had 
both Sunni and Shia Iraqis within its ranks, who saw Arab unity (and not 
political organisation based on sect) as the best way to unite the population 
against British domination.
i
  However, Abdul-Salaam Yousif identifies the 
dominant sub-group of Arab nationalists during this period as tabi’i or 
dependent, official nationalists (Yousif 1991: 172). The myth of the Arab 
revolt, a British funded guerrilla campaign against the Ottoman Empire during 
World War I in the Hijaz, gave both the British installed king, Faisal bin 
Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, and his allies cultural capital.  It also gave them 
social capital as the network of former Ottoman army officers that Faisal 
brought back to Iraq dispersed through the institutions of the state and army 
into the economy (Batatu 1989: 115-117, 319-33). This gave rise to powerful 
contradictions; although Faisal and his allies were committed to expanding the 
boundaries of the political field to include all Arabs and to rid the area of 
colonial domination, they had been allied to the most powerful colonial state, 
Britain, since 1916 and were dependent upon the British for their survival in 
Iraq (Mufti 1996: 22).  
 
The coup d'état of 1941 was a major watershed in the evolution of Arab 
nationalism in Iraq. It was an attempt to overcome the contradictions inherent 
in tabi’i Arab nationalism, but drove Britain to reinvade. Once British-led 
forces had secured control they set about purging the coercive and political 
fields of Arab nationalists.  This marked the definitive break within Arab 
nationalism, empowering more radical currents, marking the rise of the Baath 
Party as an influential competitor within both fields. 
 
The radicalisation of Arab nationalism fractured it as a political force after the 
1958 coup that rid the country of the British installed monarchy and governing 
elite.  Its social capital was divided between several serving and former senior 
military figures and the Baath Party. Those threatened by the new Iraqi 
President Abdul Karim Qasim’s agenda of land reform and social 
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transformation and his alliance with the Communist Party, backed Arab 
nationalism as the more conservative alternative, empowering a military rival, 
Abdul Salam Arif.   
 
In the struggle to dominate Iraq’s political field Arif recognised the prestige 
that Egypt’s president Nasser had accrued and allied with him, attempting to 
utilise Egypt’s social, cultural and ultimately its symbolic capital. Arif seized 
power in two coup d'états in February 1963, one removed and murdered Qasim 
and brought Arif to power in alliance with the Baath Party. The second coup 
saw Arif purge the government of its Baathist members.  
 
Arif’s brand of Arab nationalism could not dominate a fractured and highly 
contests political field and his brother, who took over from him after he was 
killed in a helicopter crash, was removed in a third coup d'état in 1968 that 
brought the Baath Party to power and should have marked the high point of 
Arab nationalism.  The Baathists set out to systematically dominate social 
capital by spreading political commissars through the army and civil service.  
This ruthless and well funded domination meant only under Baathist rule did 
the Iraqi state come to resemble Bourdieu’s definition of the state as the 
“…culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital: 
capital of physical force or instruments of coercion (army, police), economic 
capital, cultural or (better) informational capital, and symbolic capital” 
(Bourdieu 1994: 4).  
 
In spite of becoming the most powerful competitor in the political field since 
Iraq’s creation, the Baath’s struggle to impose symbolic violence on Iraq’s 
population was still relational, reacting to both groups within the field and 
externally (Rohde 2012). The construction of Baathist ideology by Michel Aflaq 
and Salah ud-Din al-Bitar, certainly placed Arab nationalism at its centre but 
was also a relational reaction to the Marxist debates that dominated the Sorbonne 
when they both studied there (Batatu 1989: 725). The resultant ideology was a 
fluid bricolage, attempting to fuse a commitment to Arab nationalism with a 
militant anti-Imperialism and a focus on state-led developmentalism. It 
produced an increasingly hybrid ideology that moved away from Arab 
nationalism towards an Iraqist vision of the political field as the party 
unsuccessfully attempted to impose its hegemony on the country. 
 
The Iraqist principle vision.  
 
The second main competitor within the political field were groups mobilising 
around the principle vision of a specifically Iraqi homeland. Primarily in 
competition with Arab nationalism, these groups tended to have a more 
pluralist conception of who could be a member of the political field, one that 
was not limited linguistically, religiously or racially.   
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The main forces representing this vision of the political field were social 
democratic Iraqist formations competing in the field from the 1930s onwards. 
These were personified by the Ahali (the People) Group. Formed in 1931 by 
young intellectuals, it set out to compete on the basis of a fusion of Leftism, 
Liberal Democracy and Iraqi nationalism. The group’s agenda promoted 
Sha’biyah (populism) or the welfare of all, regardless of class or sect.  It 
defined itself against Arab nationalist attempts to impose a political field based 
on exclusionary language and race, accusing them of being self-serving and 
conservative, promoting unity above social development.  Instead, national 
cohesion would be delivered through political mobilisation to gain social 
transformation, democracy and equality (Bashkin 2009: 61-65, 132, Khadduri 
1951: 71-74, 93, 113, Batatu 1989: 300-303). 
 
The second major group fighting for an Iraqist definition of the political field 
were the Communist Party. Founded in the mid-1930s, the party’s increasing 
popularity amongst Iraq’s growing urban educated classes was repeatedly 
tempered by extensive persecution. Its social capital reached its peak under the 
leadership of Yusuf Salman Yusuf (Comrade Fahad), General Secretary from 
1941 to 1947 (Franzen 2011: 40, 56 Batatu 1989: 530-531). From the first 
publication of its aims in August 1935, the Communist Party made its pluralist 
definition of Iraq’s political field clear, arguing that all minorities had cultural 
rights and that the Kurdish nation, if they chose, had the right to self-
determination (Batatu 1989: 436-437, Franzen 2011: 49-52 and Bashkin 2009: 
100-101). 
 
Under Abdul Karim Qasim’s rule, 1958 to 1963, the Iraqist place within the 
political field solidified (Baskin 2011). However, Qasim’s own position came 
to be defined by his lack of social capital. The strength of support for Arab 
nationalism across the officer corps of the army led to a constant challenge to 
Qasim. It was this vulnerability that drove him into a tense and constantly 
shifting alliance with the Communist Party, who delivered coercive capital 
backed by their militia balanced against Arab nationalists in the military.  
 
Qasim’s deployment of symbolic capital was relational, shaped by the power of 
both the Communist Party and Arab nationalism. Qasim set out to counter the 
power of Arab nationalism through the Ministry of Guidance, producing a 
cultural capital that imposed Iraqist definitions on the political field. State 
supervised television and radio broadcasts, book production and cultural 
festivals all sought to emphasise an ethnically and religiously plural Iraqist 
nationalism that was open to all (Bashkin 2011: 296-7, 302, Davis 2005: 111, 
125, 133). 
 
Between 1958 and 1963, the Iraqi Communist Party enjoyed the strongest 
social capital of any group in the political field. In 1958 it had 3,000 
disciplined party members with another 3,000 supporters. Its newspaper, 
Ittihad al-Sha’b, had a circulation of 25,000 (Yousif 1991: 187, Mufti 1996: 
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112). It backed Qasim’s leadership, attracting a constituency that had gained 
from land reform and government house building (Batatu 1989: 808, 851, 
Franzen 2011: 95). However, such an overt defence of Qasim brought it into 
direct conflict with Arab nationalists.  The resultant bloodshed made Nasser 
attack both Qasim and the Communist Party, labelling the president “the 
divider of Iraq” and the communists “shu‘ubis”, damning them as partisan 
separatists (Franzen 2011: 97).  
 
As soon as the Baath party seized power in 1968, its ideational fluidity allowed 
it to take the symbols of their competitors and simultaneously deploy coercive 
capital and symbolic violence against them. After 1968, the party set about 
tempering its commitment to Arab nationalism in recognition of Iraq’s ethnic, 
religious and linguistic diversity. The party’s ideological machinery focused on 
‘Mesopotamianism’, “the identification of nationhood with the ancient territory 
between the Tigris and the Euphrates” giving it “equal status to and, 
occasionally, even priority over pan-Arabism” (Baram 1991: xxi). This, it was 
hoped, would create an ideational space in which the Kurdish population, along 
with Shia and Sunni Arabs, could be convinced to bond with the Baathist’s 
conception of the nation.
ii
   
 
The evolving shape and content of this ideational pluralism was heavily 
dependent upon the Baathists comparative power within the political field. 
When, in 1975, Iraq did a deal with Iran to end Iranian support for the Iraqi 
Kurdish insurgency, the Kurdish cultural content of Baathist ideology was 
reduced to reflect the reduction of the Kurdish nationalist threat (Baram 1991: 
21). When, on the other hand, the Baathist government were faced with mass 
protests during the Marad al-Ras, Shia religious processions of 1977, the 
regime made a concerted effort to integrate Shia religious symbolism into its 
symbolic capital and increase the reach of its social capital by co-opting Shia 
religious figures and institutions (Jabar 2003: 213-214, Tripp 2000: 217, Mufti 
1996: 224). 
 
However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 posed the gravest threat to Baathist 
rule since it seized power. It sought to reduce this threat by invading Iran in 
1980, hoping to impose a quick settlement on a weak regime. Instead, the war 
dragged on for eight years. In response to the revolution and then an extended 
war of attrition, the regime once again restructured its ideology, initiating ‘The 
Project for the Rewriting of History’.  This was a second attempt to develop a 
Baathist symbolic capital through ‘Mesopotamianism’, the inclusion of all the 
disparate elements of Iraqi society within a vision of the political field that 
hoped to exclude the revolutionary propaganda from Tehran (Davis 2005: 3, 6-
9).  
 
The growth of Shia centric visions of the political field.  
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The growth of a Shia centric principle position within Iraq’s political field was 
driven by two separate groups with different types of social, cultural and 
symbolic capital, first the Shia ulama and secondly lay political activists.  
However, for the first fifty years of the Iraqi state, the majority of politically 
active Shia Iraqis mobilised round other principles of vision, primarily Iraqist 
nationalism but also Arab nationalism with both the Communist and the Baath 
Party having a majority Shia membership.   
 
In the early days of the British mandate the Shia religious hierarchy were 
certainly active in the political field, but their deployment of cultural and 
symbolic capital was focused on driving the British out and promoting an Iraqist 
definition of the field and its membership (Sluglett 2007: 221-228). This resulted 
in British repression and the exclusion of a number of senior Shia ulama or 
mujtahids from Iraq.  It was under the Qasim regime that the forces of Shia 
political Islam, in the form of the Dawa Party (Hizb al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya), 
began to cohere and enter the political field. The Dawa Party was formed as a 
direct response to the growing power of the Iraqi Communist Party.  For the 
first time since 1922, senior mujtahid’s abandoned their ‘quietist’ approach and 
began to openly criticise both Qasim’s government but also the threat posed by 
Communism. This was partly driven by the steady reduction in the cultural and 
social capital of the mujtahids, as the number of students training to join the 
Shia ulama declined (Batatu 1982 Mallat 1993: 9, 15). 
 
As a member of the ulama, the Dawa Party’s key ideologue, Muhammad Baqir 
al-Sadr, could capitalise on both religious, social and cultural capital.  He wrote 
two of his major texts Falsafatuna (Our Philosophy) and Iqtisaduna (Our 
Economic System) in 1959 and 1961 at the height of Qasim’s revolutionary 
zeal and the peak of the Communist Party’s influence.  They were intended as 
key interventions in the political field, deploying the cultural capital of the Shia 
ulama to combat what they saw as a threat to their very survival (Browers 2012 
Batatu 1982b). 
 
Although the return of senior Shia mujtahids to Iraq’s political field and the 
formation of the Dawa Party mark the start of the rise of Shia Islamism in Iraq, 
this was not an assertion of a specifically Shia identity juxtaposed against other 
communalist identities.  Instead it was targeted at the dangers of atheism, 
problems with Qasim’s policies and the growing threat of communism, 
deploying symbolic capital in Iraq’s political field in the name of a 
universalising Islam. 
 
It was Baathist attempts at dominating Iraq’s political field that transformed 
Shia political identity, with the deployment of coercive capital and symbolic 
violence pushing activists towards a definition of the political field that gave 
priority to an exclusionary Shia identity. This process began in 1977 but was 
accelerated by the Iranian revolution. Predictably, the Baathist response was an 
extensive crackdown on protests and the arrest and subsequent execution of 
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Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr himself, his sister and hundreds of his followers and 
Dawa Party members (Jabar 2003: 225-234, Tripp 2005: 220, Mallat 1993b: 
226, Cockburn 2008: 47-50). Although Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and the Dawa 
Party overestimated their power vis-a-via the Iraqi state, such an extensive 
deployment of coercive capital created an unbridgeable division within the 
political field between the Baath Party and the Shia population. As a senior 
mujtahid, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr had extensive cultural and symbolic capital. 
His murder, along with his sister, was certainly designed to intimidate but it also 
made it impossible for the Baath to deploy viable symbolic capital within the 
Shia section of the population.  
 
If the events of 1979-80 marked a major breach in relations between the 
Baathist state and the Shia population, the aftermath of Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait made that breach public. An armed uprising across the south of Iraq 
erupted after the coalition offensive to drive Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The fact 
that the regime lost temporary control of Shia majority areas, the level of 
coercion and destruction deployed to regain control, the mobilisation of an 
opposition force against the regime and finally the involvement of the 
previously ‘queitist’ Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei, all combined to transform the 
political discourse used by those groups seeking to mobilise the opinion of Shia 
Iraqis.  Fanar Haddad argues that 1991, more than any other moment in Iraqi 
history, created a “…clear delineation of Shi’i identity within Iraq, distinct from 
Iraq’s other constituent parts and most certainly from the state” (Haddad 2010: 
86, 97). 
 
The final change in Shia identity under Baathist rule occurred in the 1990s.  It 
was during this time that a comparatively young and charismatic mujtahid, 
Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, built an activist, populist Shia religious movement 
that challenged the Baathist state and created a space within the political field 
for an overtly Shia political presence.  
 
Sadr’s main goal was to make the cultural capital of the Shia religious 
establishment more politically relevant to ordinary Shias. To achieve this he 
drew a powerful distinction between senior Shia Grand Ayatollahs and himself. 
The Grand Ayatollahs had become detached from society, unable or unwilling 
to become involved in the everyday suffering of their followers.  Muhammad 
Sadiq al-Sadr, on the other hand, developed a populist religion whose 
economic capital, in the form of charitable networks, helped the poor and 
whose symbolic capital, in the form of a populist Islamic jurisprudence, was 
directly relevant to the everyday needs of Shias (Allawi 2007: 55-60, Cockburn 
2008: 112-124, Jabar 2003: 183, 273).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Baathist state removed this potent challenge by 
assassinating Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in February 1999.  However, his 
lasting legacy was the transformation of cultural and symbolic capital that 
surrounded Shia Islam into a powerful and overtly political force, deploying it 
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within Iraq’s political field not just to challenge Baathism but also to break the 
previous constraints placed upon politically active mujtahids by the Shia 
clerical hierarchy. It produced a new exclusively Shia principle vision. 
 
Kurdish nationalism and Iraq’s political field.  
 
Under the Ottoman Empire and in the early days of the Iraqi political field, the 
rise of a modernist Kurdish nationalism and with it attempts to define an 
exclusionary Kurdish identity were constrained by a variety of notables and 
religious organisations competing amongst each other and with the empire to 
impose local and religious identities on those who resided in what were to be 
classified as ‘Kurdish’ areas (van Bruinessen 1992: 267, 286, McDowall  2007: 
1, 2, 51, 87, 88, 94-101). The tension between localist tribal and religious 
(primarily Sufi) cultural capital constrained those seeking to deploy symbolic 
capital in the name of an assertive Kurdish nationalism (Zubaida 1991: 200, van 
Bruinessen 1992: 7, 267, McDowall 2007: 122, 157-159).  
 
The political field in Iraqi Kurdistan after 1958, saw a struggle for domination 
between those controlling the Iraqi state, first Qasim and then Arif, and three 
other groups, the Iraqi Communist Party, the leftist urban intellectuals of the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party and those conservative tribal and religious figures 
grouped around Mulla Mustafa Barzani. Mulla Mustafa, as a large landowner 
had economic capital that was augmented by his social capital as a tribal leader 
and his cultural capital as a religious figure.  However, the integration of 
Kurdistan into the world economy and the area’s integration into the Iraqi state 
had empowered a group of urban intellectuals, many the product of Iraqi 
colleges and universities.  The formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic 
Party in 1946 was an unstable alliance between these two groups (Romano, 
2006, 188). This conflict was brought to a head by the rising power of the Iraqi 
Communist Party after 1958 and Qasim’s implementation of land reform in 
1959. The leftists within the KDP allied with the Iraqi Communist Party and 
pushed ahead with land reform in the areas under their control. Conservative 
Kurdish landowners, on the other hand, threatened by this land reform and 
sensing Qasim’s weakness, launched a rebellion against him, which Mulla 
Mustafa and, eventually, the KDP backed (McDowall 2007: 304, 311).  
 
The resultant recriminations finally split the Kurdish national movement, with 
the young ‘modernist’ nationalists, Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, leaving 
the KDP to form a new party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  Fighting 
between Kurdish forces and Baghdad continued sporadically until 1988, when 
the Baath launched the Anfal campaign, designed to depopulate Kurdish areas.  
The use of indiscriminate force and chemical weapons is conservatively 
estimated to have killed between 150,000-200,000. Its aim, however, was to 
demonstrate the unimaginable costs of sustained opposition to the Baath within 
Iraq’s political field (McDowall, 2007: 359, Tripp 2000: 245). However, in a 
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comparable way to Shia political mobilisation, the genocidal aspirations of the 
Iraqi government created a specifically Iraqi Kurdish political field. 
 
However, it was Baathist foreign policy adventurism that, in the aftermath of 
the defeat of Iraqi forces in Kuwait, finally led to the unambiguous 
solidification of an Iraqi Kurdish political field, created under international 
protection. However, the competing principle visions within that nascent field, 
led to the new Kurdistan Regional Government’s division, with the KDP and 
PUK fighting each other and then refusing to pool social, coercive and 
economic capital, instead opting to create two separate administrations and two 
separate militia forces. 
 
Overall, divisions amongst those fighting for a Kurdish principle vision 
constrained the evolution of a specifically Kurdish political field.   Eventually 
it was a combination of the genocidal aspirations and foreign policy 
adventurism of the Baathist government that gave rise to the space and impetus 
needed for the creation of a specifically Kurdish political field.  
 
Conclusions. 
 
A great deal of analysis and commentary on Iraq since invasion and regime 
change in 2003 has stressed the dominance of its political field by those 
deploying exclusionary sectarian and ethnic principles of vision.  The last 
thirteen years of Iraq’s contemporary history was then read backwards to find the 
same principles of vision animating political competition since the creation of 
Iraq.  The deployment of a Historical Sociological approach to the longue durée 
of Iraq’s history, as opposed to the last thirteen years, clearly shows such 
sectarian caricatures do great damage to the pluralistic and decentred nature of 
that competition.  As this paper has argued, those seeking to deploy symbolic 
violence on the political field to create exclusivist Shia or Kurdish definitions 
were clearly present at times in Iraq’s pre-2003 history.  However, they were 
rivalled and indeed marginalised by at least two other competing principles of 
vision with very different definitional aims for Iraq’s political field.  
 
Intriguingly, the two major external players in Iraq’s political field, the British, 
from 1920 to 1958, and the Americans, from 2003 onwards, both used their 
coercive, financial, social and symbolic capital in an attempt to impose a 
definition of Iraq’s political field that also stressed its religious, ethnic and tribal 
divisions (Longrigg: 1953, Dobbins, Jones, Runkle, Mohandas: 2009, Dodge: 
2003, Dodge: 2012).  During Britain’s domination of Iraq, from 1920 onwards, 
the major indigenous competitors in the political field overtly rejected Britain’s 
attempt to impose this definition.  However, the United States’ understanding of 
Iraq’s political field, from 2003 onwards, dominated as it was by religious and 
ethnic divisions, was eagerly seized upon and promoted as a principle political 
vision by those Iraqis, many of whom who had been in exile until 2003, seeking 
to dominate the post-Baathist political field (Allawi 2007: 53, Dodge: 2012). 
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It is the deployment of Historical Sociology that can avoid ahistorical analysis 
and political primordialisation of Iraq.  However, this paper has argued that 
within Historical Sociology, the modernist approach to understanding national 
identity, personified by the work of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, 
carried within it certain problems, excessive structuralism, ‘sociologism’, 
Eurocentricsm and reductionism, that make it partially problematic when 
deployed to explain the role of identity politics within Iraq. The paper has sought 
to overcome these shortcomings, by deploying the field theory of Pierre 
Bourdieu. This allows for an assessment of Iraq’s political field, over the 
length of its existence, not just since 2003, that stresses the competitive and 
most importantly relational interaction between competing principles of vision 
within the country’s political field.  By deploying Bourdieu’s work, the 
powerful insights of Historical Sociology and the modernist approach to 
nationalism can be utilised without the danger of the Eurocentric teleology it 
has powerfully been critiqued for. The result is an analysis that not only 
captures the plural competition within Iraq’s political field but also defends the 
possibility of alternative futures for a country and a population that has 
suffered from so much violence and a number of incompetent international 
interventions. 
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i
 This would include national political figures like Fadil al-Jamali and Sadiq al-
Bassim (Baram 1991: 5). 
ii
 Baram quotes Saddam Hussein making this argument to textbook drafters in 
1975, (Baram, 1991, 20). 
